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FUGITIVE SLAVES AND SHIP-JUMPING SAILORS:
THE ENFORCEMENT AND SURVIVAL OF COERCED
LABOR
Jonathan M. Gutoff*
In 1840, a future abolitionist and leader of the Boston bar named
Richard Henry Dana' recorded the flogging he witnessed during a two-year
absence from his studies at Harvard, and lamented: "A man-a human
being, made in God's likeness-fastened up and flogged like a beast!"2
Dana noted that one of the victim's fellow laborers who protested the
beating was next.3 As the second man was beaten, his master called out,
"If you want to know what I flog you for, I'll tell you. It's because I like to
do it! -- because I like to do it! It suits me!-- That's what I do it for!"4 As
the second victim writhed in pain he called out, "0 Jesus Christ! 0 Jesus
Christ!"5 To this his master responded, "Don't call on Jesus Christ....
Jesus Christ can't help you now!",
6
This scene of cruelty that Dana witnessed did not take place on a
plantation, and the flogging was not administered by a slave owner.
Rather, it occurred on board the brig Pilgrim, an American ship out of
Boston.7 The victims of the floggings were not slaves of African descent,
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1. See generally CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY DANA: A BIOGRAPHY
(1890) (reproducing the written memoirs of Richard Henry Dana).
2. RICHARD HENRY DANA, Two YEARS BEFORE THE MAST 104 (Random House 1936)
(1840).
3. See id. at 104-06 (describing the flogging of the second victim, John the Swede).
4. Id. at 106.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11. I do not mean to imply that Dana was opposed to the use of corporal
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but free men, one an American of European descent and the other a Swede,
who had signed on to the vessel of their own will. 8 The treatment to which
they were subject, however, is the type of treatment that most do not
associate with any form of labor other than chattel slavery. By the
nineteenth century, American sailors had the questionable distinction of
being the only wage laborers in the United States who were, like slaves,
subject to the sort of abuse Dana witnessed aboard the Pilgrim.9
Some observers in the nineteenth century noted the similarity between
the lots of slaves and sailors. Thus, the first of the two seamen, whose
flogging Dana narrated, protested, "I'm no Negro slave," to which the
captain responded as he started to beat the man with a rope, "Then I'll
make you one."' When on his travels through the "cotton kingdom,"
Frederick Law Olmsted heard a plantation overseer say that he "wouldn't
mind killing a nigger more than [he] would a dog."" Olmsted wrote that
the comment about killing slaves "was exactly like what [he had] heard
said, again and again, by Northern shipmasters and officers, with regard to
seamen."' 2  Nonetheless, modem historians have generally ignored the
similarities between the status of maritime laborers and the status of
slaves."'
With the exception of slave labor, historians have viewed the
nineteenth century as a time in which at-will employment, where the
employer has nothing more than economic power over employees,
triumphed over the concept that employment involves the literal
punishment on sailors. This passage illustrates, however, that Dana was opposed to
undeserved corporal punishment. See id. at 106 (noting Dana's disgust at the undeserved
flogging of the two men).
8. DANA, supra note 2. at 103.
9. See generally MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
(1984) 1-23 (discussing writings on punishment written by seamen in the nineteenth
century). To be sure, there were others in the nineteenth century who were subject to
physical discipline in addition to slaves and seamen, notably convicts, women, and children.
See id (contemplating legal, religious, and customary reasons for physical discipline against
women and children). The purpose of this article is not to dispute the fact that these
categories of people were engaged in labor, however defined. Rather, the relevant point is
that they were not considered employees by nineteenth century ideology. See AMY DRU
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE
AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 28-29 (1998).
10. DANA, supra note 2, at 104.
11. FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE COTTON KINGDOM: A TRAVELER'S OBSERVATIONS
ON COTTON AND SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAN SLAVE STATES 452 (Arthur M. Schlesinger ed.,
1953) (1861).
12. Id. at 453.
13. But see PETER LINEBAUGH & MARCUS REDIKER, THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA:
SAILORS, SLAVES, COMMONERS, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
ATLANTIC (2000) (discussing the harsh treatment of sailors between the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries within the context of the spread of Atlantic capitalism through the
maritime state).
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submission of servants to a master's physical control. 14  However,
throughout the nineteenth century, decades after the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment had declared an end to involuntary servitude, 5
seamen on American vessels were subject to physical coercion by their
masters in addition to capture, summary rendition, and imprisonment if
they attempted to leave their work. 6  Indeed, the provisions of the
notorious Fugitive Slave Act, which required the rendition of runaway
slaves and provided for the punishment of those who aided them, 7 appear
to have been modeled on provisions in the Merchant Seamen's Act of
1790, which dealt with the problem of ship-jumping sailors. 8
There is no denying that the legal regimes under which enslaved
Africans and merchant seamen toiled were very different. The horrors
suffered by Africans on the middle passage from Africa to North America
and the subsequent sufferings they and their descendants endured in the
fields, shops, and households of the eastern seaboard and the Caribbean
were far greater than those inflicted on seamen.' 9 Seamen were bound to a
single voyage and had some legal protections. 20  Nonetheless, there are
interesting similarities between the two groups.
Like slaves, merchant seamen stand out as an anomaly in the
nineteenth century, an era otherwise supposedly devoted to the ideal of free
labor. Like slaves, merchant seamen (along with fishermen) were subject
to federal laws providing for their forced return to their toils if they
deserted. 21 However, the source of Congress' power to so legislate is not
apparent on the face of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court ostensibly resolved this difficulty by deciding that both the
14. See generally ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991)
[hereinafter FREE LABOR] (arguing that contractual servitude in America was redefined as a
form of involuntary servitude in the late nineteenth century by running afoul of the new
American anti-slavery tradition and thereby leaving free labor as the sole legitimate
employment relationship among white adults).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16. 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, at * 177 (1873).
17. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864).
18. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131 (1790). The provisions of the Merchant
Seamen's Act were made applicable to sailors in the fisheries in 1792. Act of Feb. 16,
1792, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 229 (1792).
19. See NIGEL TATTERSFIELD, THE FORGOTTEN TRADE: COMPRISING THE LOG OF THE
DANIEL AND HENRY OF 1700 AND ACCOUNTS OF THE SLAVE TRADE FROM THE MINOR PORTS
OF ENGLAND, 1698-1725, at 155-91 (1991) (describing the passage of one vessel engaged in
the slave trade and estimating that out of 452 slaves taken aboard, 206 had died in the
middle passage). See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: 1440-1870 (1997) (detailing the history of the Atlantic slave
trade).
20. 3 KENT, supra note 16, at *181-97.
21. See infra Part I.
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Fugitive Slave Clause22 and the grant of admiralty jurisdiction23 implied
that Congress has legislative powers not specifically included in the various
grants found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.2
This Article explores the relationship between the law of maritime
labor and the law of slavery. In the eighteenth century, both were part of a
whole range of unfree labor relations. In the nineteenth century, both
remained unfree labor even as the rest of the working world increasingly
depended on monetary and contractual relations. Additionally, both slaves
and sailors labored in a world subject to federal legislation.
Part one of this Article examines the Fugitive Slave Act and the
Merchant Seamen's Act. Part II looks at the history of labor prior to the
founding of the United States of America. Part III looks at the problems of
the maritime labor market and the problems of slave labor, noting the
similarities between the two. Part IV looks at nineteenth century
developments in the control of both maritime labor and fugitive slaves.
Part V demonstrates some connections between the legal regimes
governing slave and maritime labor.
I. THE MERCHANT SEAMEN'S ACT AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT.
A. The Merchant Seamen's Act
In 1790, Congress enacted a bill that provided for the summary
seizure of laborers fleeing from their work and for their return to their place
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o Person held to Service or Labour
in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due").
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States to
"all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction").
24. Compare Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 615 (1842) (concluding that the
Fugitive Slave Clause carried with it the implicit power of Congress to enforce it), with
Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889) (concluding that the
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction implies congressional authority to legislate in
the area of admiralty law). The Supreme Court indicated that the implied legislative power
pursuant to the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was first recognized in Waring v. Clarke, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 440 (1847). See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36, 41 (1943) (asserting that the Supreme Court had, since Waring v. Clarke, sustained
Congress' amendments to maritime law). Professor David Robertson, however, has argued
that Butler was the first case in which that recognition took place. See DAVID W.
ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 144 (1970) (stating that Justice Bradley, in
Butler v. Boston, held that "[a]s the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... the power of legislation on the
same subject must necessarily be in the national legislature and not in the state legislature").
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of work.25 The Act also provided for the punishment of anyone attempting
to aid a laborer who was fleeing his master.26 The laborers subject to the
Act were not slaves or indentured laborers, but sailors.2' The Act was not
the Fugitive Slave Act, which would later be passed by the Second
Congress in 1793,28 but the Merchant Seamen's Act.29
The Merchant Seamen's Act originated just over a year after the new
federal government came into being. On April 29, 1790, the House of
Representatives appointed a committee to prepare a bill for the government
of seamen in the merchant service. 30 The bill was presented to the House
and, after some minor amendments, was passed without debate on June
25th.3 On June 28th, the Senate received and read the bill and assigned it
to a committee. 32 The committee proposed three amendments with which
the Senate agreed.33 The House agreed to all but one of the amendments,
from which the Senate then receded.34 The bill was then signed by the
Speaker of the House and the Vice President.35 On July 20, 1790, President
Washington signed it into law.36
This scant legislative history" may not be sufficient to create a clear
picture as to what prompted the passage of the Merchant Seamen's Act, but
the terms of the Act indicate the importance of preserving maritime labor
for the new republic. Those engaged in maritime labor were protected so
long as they were working; if they tried to avoid their work, they were
punished.38
25. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790).
26. Id. at § 4.
27. Id. at § 1.
28. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (repealed 1864).
29. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 1, 1 Stat. 131 (1790).
30. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 389 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1977) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
31. Id. at 476-77.
32. Id. at 478,491.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 506-09.
35. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 30, at 506-09.
36. Id. at 521.
37. Perhaps one reason why Congress had no real interest in debating the Merchant
Seamen's Act was that, at the same time, it was considering the much more hotly contested
issue of whether to leave New York. See WILLIAM J. MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM
MACLAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 1789-1791, at 304-06 (Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1965) (1890) (recording the following entry: "Committed the
Settlement bill and one for the regulation of seamen. And now came the residence,"
followed by a detailed account of the discussion on moving the residence of Congress out of
New York along with a less than flattering description of contemporary New Yorkers).
38. See Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 5, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (1790) (stating that seamen
may be imprisoned for refusing to go to sea).
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Much of the Act was devoted to protecting maritime labor. Section
one required a written contract and provided that seamen without a contract
were to be paid the highest wage shipping from the same port within three
months' time.39 Section three provided that a ship's mate, along with the
majority of the crew, had the right to have their vessel inspected for its
seaworthiness.4" Section four prohibited debts in excess of one dollar from
being collected from seamen while engaged in a voyage.4' Section six
provided for regular payment of wages and for penalties for the non-
payment of wages.42 Section eight required vessels that weighed over 150
tons and were manned by more than ten sailors to have ample medical
supplies, 43 and section nine specified the minimum provisions per person
that the ship must carry on transatlantic voyages." These provisions
arguably protected the personal safety of seamen and, by giving them a
certain amount of economic security, may have encouraged them to join
the merchant service.
These beneficent provisions were, however, balanced by coercive
ones.45  Section two set out penalties for seamen who failed to put
themselves on board at the appointed hour.46 Section three provided that
any seaman who failed to sail on a vessel that had been deemed seaworthy
after inspection would be subject to both imprisonment without the rights
of bail, main prize, or habeas corpus, and a fine in the amount of twice the
seaman's advance.47 Section four set out a penalty for harboring fugitive
seamen of ten dollars for each day the seaman was kept in hiding, with half
the penalty going to the person prosecuting the action and the other half to
the United States.48  Section five provided that if a seaman was absent
without leave for any period less than forty-eight hours, he would forfeit
three days' wages for every day that he was absent.49  Moreover, if a
seaman was absent longer than forty-eight hours, he forfeited all of his
39. Id. at § 1.
40. Id. at § 3.
41. Id. at § 4.
42. Id. at § 6.
43. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 8.
44. Id. at § 9.
45. Many of these coercive provisions appear to have been taken from the British Act
for the Better Regulation and Government of the Merchants Service of 1729. See MARCUS
REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD 140-41 (1987) (describing how the act "limited
[the] prerogatives" of seamen).
46. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 2, 1 Stat 131, 131-32 (1790).
47. Id. at § 3. The question of how this provision of the Merchant Seamen's Act related
to, or passed muster under, the Non-Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, has not been discussed.
48. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (1790).
49. Id. at § 5.
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wages, as well as all of his goods and chattels that were already onboard
the vessel; he was also required to pay the master of the vessel for any
damages sustained in hiring a replacement as a result of his absence.5 °
Section 7 provided that the master of a vessel could obtain the arrest of an
absent or deserting seaman simply by demonstrating that the seaman had
signed a contract; upon proof of contract and desertion, the arrested seaman
would then be confined until the vessel on which the seaman had agreed to
sail was ready to leave or the master requested his discharge, with all costs
of confinement taken from the seaman's wages.5 In 1792, without any real
52controversy, Congress extended the provisions of the Merchant Seamen's
Act that provided for the capture, return, and punishment of ship-jumping
seamen to fishermen.53
During the first years of the republic, Congress regularly considered
the constitutional basis for each bill it enacted into law. However, neither
the Merchant Seamen's Act nor the Act regulating fisheries was prefaced
with any finding as to the basis of congressional power to legislate.54 This
aspect of the Acts is discussed later in this article.55  It is worth noting,
however, that while the Merchant Seamen's Act, which applied only to
ships in the oceanic and interstate coasting trades, could have been enacted
under Congress' power to regulate commerce,5 6 the Act regulating fisheries
did not apply only to the movement of fish among the states or between the
United States and foreign nations or the Indian Tribes, but also to the
relations on ships that brought fish to a single state for processing and
sale. 57  Therefore, it was not within the constitutional power to regulate
commerce.
58
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 7.
52. No source records any Senate debate on this topic. The Annals of Congress records
some discussion on the propriety of subsidizing the fisheries, but they do not discuss the
propriety of subjecting workers in the fisheries to summary seizure and return. See 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 362-401 (1792) (discussing subsidy of fisheries).
53. See Act of Feb. 16, 1792, ch. 6, § 4, 1 Stat. 229, 231 (1792) (providing that
[f]ishermen deserting their vessels "shall be liable to the same penalties as deserting seamen
or mariners.., and upon the like complaint and proof, be apprehended and detained").
54. See Act of July 20, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 131, 131 (1790); Act of Feb. 16, 1792, ch. 6, §
1, 1 Stat. 229, 229 (neglecting to include findings of constitutional authority).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
56. See U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 3 (defining Congress' commerce power).
57. Act of Feb. 16, 1792, ch. 6, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 229, 230-31 (applying the provisions of
the act to ships based on their weights, but making no distinction based on whether or not
the ships actually were engaged in interstate travel). For a good account of the cod industry
and the method by which fish were processed and then sold, see MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1997).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce).
94 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:1
Whatever the presumed constitutional basis for regulating sailors and
fisherman, several provisions of the Merchant Seamen's Act were nearly
identical to provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act, passed by Congress two
and a half years later.
B. The Fugitive Slave Act
In 1788, three Virginians went into Pennsylvania and took John Davis,
a former slave who was free under Pennsylvania law, to Virginia where he
was claimed as a slave.59 Later that same year, a Pennsylvania court
indicted the three Virginians for kidnapping.6 ° In 1791, the governor of
Pennsylvania requested that Virginia return the fugitives pursuant to the
provision in the Constitution requiring that those fleeing from justice in one
state to another state be returned to the state from which they had fled.6'
The governor of Virginia referred the matter to the attorney general of
Virginia. 6' The attorney general advised the governor not to extradite the
fugitives to Pennsylvania because the Constitution had not provided any
method for putting the Fugitive from Justice Clause into effect, and the
governor of Virginia could not comply with the mandate of the
Constitution without some affirmative provision of law. 63 As a result of
Virginia's refusal, the governor of Pennsylvania wrote to President
Washington seeking legislation that would enable the states to deliver
fugitives to other states.64 In October 1791, Washington transmitted the
various communications of the officials in Virginia and Pennsylvania to
Congress. 65 Congress referred the issue to a committee.
66
The House of Representatives' committee proposed "a bill respecting
fugitives from justice and from the service of masters., 67 As originally
59. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 84-86 (2d ed. 2001). As Finkelman explains, the Virginians thought they had
some claim to the slave, who had gained his freedom as a result of a Pennsylvania law
requiring all slaves be registered by their master. Id. at 85-86. Because of a border dispute
between Pennsylvania and Virginia, the master's failure to register the slave may have been
due to the fact that he believed that he was a resident of Virginia, which had no such
requirement. Id. at 85. When Davis rented the slave to Miller in Virginia, he was already a
legally free man and subsequently returned to Pennsylvania with the help of some alleged
abolitionists. Id. Therefore, the attempted recovery of John was considered a kidnapping
and not the return of a slave. Id. at 86.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 86-87.
64. FINKELMAN, supra note 59, at 87-88.
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. Washington's letter, along with the various communications are reprinted in 1
AM. STATE PAPERS Misc. 38, 38-43 No. 22 (1791).
67. FINKELMAN, supra note 59, at 89.
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proposed, the bill contained three sections.68 Section one required the
executive authority of any state or territory to arrest and turn over fugitives
who were wanted in another state or territory.69 Section two provided that
"fugitive slaves" could be seized by their masters and taken before any
judge or magistrate, "based on 'the depositions of two or more credible
persons, that the person so claimed doth owe, under the laws of the state
from which he fled, service or labor to the person claiming' the slave."7 °
The second section also allowed a master unable to seize a fugitive to apply
to any judge or magistrate for a warrant to effect the arrest of the fugitive.7'
The bill also provided for unspecified fines against officers refusing to
arrest, and anyone hiding or obstructing the arrest of, a fugitive from labor;
these fines could be recovered by the master through an action in either the
federal circuit or district court.72
After it left the committee, the bill was further amended. In its final
form, it included a new section two, which provided for punishment of any
person who freed a fugitive from justice who was being transported to the
state from which he had fled by a fine of not more than $500 and a term of
imprisonment of not more than one year.73 The third section contained no
provision for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of fugitives from labor
whom their masters had been unable to seize.74 The final section, now the
fourth, contained no penalties for interfering with the arrest of a fugitive
from labor and set the fine for helping a fugitive at $500, recoverable by
the master in an action for debt in any court (not just the circuit and district
courts).75 The final bill was signed into law on February 12, 1793.76
Read together, the provisions of the Merchant Seamen's Act, designed
to prevent the desertion of seamen and to provide for the recovery of those
seamen who did desert, and the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act,
dealing with the recovery and return of runaway slaves, are strikingly
similar.
68. Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption of the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1793, 56 J. S. HIST. 397, 408-10 (1990).
69. Id. at 409, n.37.
70. Id. at n.38.
71. Id.
72. FINKELMAN, supra note 59, at 91 (comparing the rights of fugitives and slaves
under the House Bill of 1791).
73. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 302, 302 (1793).
74. Id. at § 3.
75. Id. at § 4.
76. Id.
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MERCHANT SEAMEN'S
ACT OF 1790
SEC. 7. And be it ifurther]
enacted, That if any seaman or
mariner, who shall have signed
a contract to perform a voyage,
shall, at any port or place,
desert, or shall absent himself
from such ship or vessel,
without leave of the master, or
officer commanding in the
absence of the master, it shall
be lawful for any justice of
peace within the United States
(upon the complaint of the
master) to issue his warrant to
apprehend such deserter, and
bring him before such justice;
and if it shall then appear by
due proof, that he has signed a
contract within the intent and
meaning of this act, and that the
voyage agreed for is not
finished, altered, or the contract
otherwise dissolved, and that
such seaman or mariner has
deserted the ship or vessel, or
absented himself without leave,
the said justice shall commit
him to the house of correction
or common goal of the city,
town or place, there to remain
until the said ship or vessel
shall be ready to proceed on her
voyage, or till the master shall
require his discharge, and then
to be delivered to the said
master, he paying all the cost of
such commitment, and
deducting the same out of the
wages due to such seaman or
mariner.
FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT OF
1793
SEC. 3. And be it also
enacted, That when a person
held to labour in any of the
United States, or in either of the
territories on the northwest or
south of the river Ohio, under
the laws thereof, shall escape
into any other of the said states
or territory, the person to whom
such labour or service may be
due, his agent or attorney, is
hereby empowered to seize or
arrest such fugitive from labour,
and to take him or her before
any judge of the circuit or
district courts of the United
States, residing or being within
the state, or before any
magistrate of a county, city or
town corporate, wherein such
seizure or arrest shall be made,
and upon proof to the
satisfaction of such judge or
magistrate, either by oral
testimony or affidavit taken
before and certified by a
magistrate of any such state or
territory, that the person so
seized or arrested, doth, under
the laws of the state or territory
from which he or she fled, owe
service or labour to the person
claiming him or her, it shall be
the duty of such judge or
magistrate to give a certificate
thereof to such claimant, his
agent or attorney, which shall
be sufficient warrant for
removing the said fugitive from
labour, to the state or territory
from which he or she fled.
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SEC. 4. And be it [further]
enacted, That if any person
shall harbor or secrete any
seaman or mariner belonging to
any ship or vessel, knowing
them to belong thereto, every
such person, on conviction
thereof before any court in the
city, town or county where he,
she or they may reside, shall
forfeit and pay ten dollars for
every day which he, she or they
shall continue so to harbor or
secrete such seaman or mariner,
one half to the use of the person
prosecuting for the same, the
other half to the use of the
United States.
SEC. 4. And be it further
enacted, That any person who
shall knowingly and willingly
obstruct or hinder such
claimant, his agent or attorney
in so seizing or arresting such
fugitive from labour, or shall
rescue such fugitive from such
claimant, his agent or attorney
when so arrested pursuant to the
authority herein given or
declared; or shall harbor or
conceal such person after notice
that he or she was a fugitive
from labour, as aforesaid, shall,
for either of the said offences,
forfeit and pay the sum of five
hundred dollars. Which penalty
may be recovered by and for
the benefit of such claimant, by
action of debt, in any court
proper to try the same; saving
moreover to the person
claiming such labour or service,
his right of action for or on
account of the said injuries or
either of them.
To be sure, the above comparison reveals some notable differences.
The Merchant Seamen's Act gave jurisdiction to the justices of the peace
for proceedings to seize runaway seamen, while the Fugitive Slave Act
gave jurisdiction to any state or federal court for proceedings to recover
runaway slaves." Moreover, the penalty for harboring runaway seamen
could only be recovered after a criminal conviction in state court, with half
the penalty going to the party bringing the prosecution (presumably the
United States attorney), and the other half going to the United States.78 The
penalty for hiding runaway slaves was payable to the person owning the
slaves.79 Also, the Merchant Seamen's Act required that a party seeking
77. Compare Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 133-34 (1790), with Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793).
78. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (1790).
79. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7 § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305 (1793).
98 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:1
the return of a seaman first go to a magistrate before seizing the seaman; 0
the Fugitive Slave Act, on the other hand, allowed a master to seize his
putative chattel first and then go to a magistrate." These differences,
however, are not as great as they might seem at first glance.
While the Merchant Seamen's Act did not specifically provide for
federal jurisdiction, those attempting to enforce seamen's articles of
shipping had the option of going into the federal district courts under those
courts' admiralty jurisdiction.8 2 Even prior to the Merchant Seamen's Act,
the federal district courts had jurisdiction to enforce shipping articles.8 3
Also, while the masters of vessels seeking the return of their seamen
pursuant to the act were not able to get any money from the penalties
imposed on persons aiding the seamen's flight, they were able to recover
penalties from the seamen themselves, 4 something that the owners of
fugitive slaves could not readily do as slaves had no property of their own.
Finally, while masters of vessels were required to go to a justice of the
peace to obtain warrants for seamen who had fled their vessels, and masters
of slaves seeking slaves' return were not required to obtain warrants, a
warrant was issued as a matter of course to any ship master in possession of
a written contract binding the seaman to his vessel.8 5 Because the
Merchant Seamen's Act required masters of vessels to issue written
contracts, masters in conformity with the law would have had contracts and
therefore could have readily obtained warrants8 6
III. LABOR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
From medieval times through the eighteenth century, the relationship
between individuals and their labor was judged to be one that interested the
community. Thus, workers could be forced to labor at the harvest even if
80. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790).
81. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7 § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793).
82. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789) (establishing the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States district courts).
83. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the scope of the district courts'
admiralty jurisdiction had become considerably greater than it had been at the time of
adoption. See Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 35-36 (1870) (expanding the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district courts to include all maritime contracts
consistent with the view of Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815)); Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 302 (1857) (expanding the
admiralty jurisdiction to include all torts on waters navigable in interstate or international
commerce).
84. Act of July 20, 1790, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790).
85. Id.
86. See id. at § 1 (requiring master or commander of ship to enter into an agreement in
writing with every seaman or mariner aboard).
87. See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 15-54 (discussing the labor statutes
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they were free men. There were laws from the medieval and early
modem periods requiring workers to labor under the threat of physical
punishment.8 9 These regulations, which were based on the statutes of
workers, were understood to be no different than the regulation of other
hierarchical relationships.9"
In the eighteenth century, the understanding of the relationship of the
worker to his master changed from a relationship based on status to one
based on voluntary contract.91  However, the subject of the contract
included not just labor, but also the person of the laborer.92 This was most
apparent in the cases of slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices.93
However, even unbound servants and laborers were viewed as having more
than a contract for labor with their masters. 94 For example, maritime
laborers, from the first mate to a ship's boy, whether they were slave,
bound, or free, were tied to their vessels and were, with few exceptions,
entirely subject to the will of their vessels' masters.95
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have argued that the
development of imperialism and capitalism preceding and during the
eighteenth century spawned new methods of coercing and exploiting
workers. 96 Specifically, they assert:
[T]he many expropriations of the day-of the commons by
enclosure and conquest, of time by the puritanical abolition of
holidays, of the body by child stealing and the burning of
women, and of knowledge by the destruction of guilds and
assaults on paganism-gave rise to new kinds of workers in a
new kind of slavery, enforced directly by terror.
97
Linebaugh and Rediker's description of the construction of labor in the
early modem period is both provocative and convincing. However, the fact
that various sorts of expropriation and exploitation resulted in the
that operated outside of the individual master-servant contracts).
88. See id. at 22 (stating that the mid-fourteenth century Ordinance and Statute of
Laborers included a compulsory duty to work).
89. See id. at 16 (identifying corporal punishment as an enforcement mechanism
available to masters of household servants).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 4-5 (discussing the evolution of contractual unfree labor in the United
States and England).
92. STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14. at 4.
93. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 50-51 (1975) (discussing the
masters' property interest in slaves, indentured servants, apprentices and children).
94. RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 208-25 (1946).
95. See REDIKER, supra note 45, at 207-12 (discussing the autocratic control the captain
of the ship exercised over all levels of a ship's hierarchy).
96. LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 13, at 40.
97. Id.
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oppression, or, as Linebaugh and Rediker describe it, the enslavement of
workers during this period does not explain why seamen were singled out
by federal legislation for exceptionally oppressive treatment. Nor does it
explain why the maritime labor market continued to be regulated by
physical, as opposed to economic, coercion and why that coercion
remained even after slavery had ended.98
A. Slave Labor and Maritime Labor
Slaves were, of course, regarded as a form of property. 99 Slavery as an
institution was recognized throughout the colonies' early states. 00
Evidence indicates that from the earliest period of colonization, claims by
masters in one colony for the return of their fleeing slaves from another
colony appear to have been allowed.'0 ' To be sure, slavery was not
monistic, but the expectation of slave owners in English-speaking North
America was that they could seek the aid of the government in the capture
of any of their human chattel who ran for freedom. 102
Most maritime labor was free; however, by entering into a particular
voyage, a seaman subjected himself to labor discipline more severe than
any other type, with the exceptions of slaves and men in the army and
98. The work of Linebaugh and Rediker is nevertheless relevant to this discussion.
Their work centers on the oppression of maritime labor through physical coercion in the
British Empire during the eighteenth century, a period and place in which labor was,
according to Linebaugh and Rediker, generally subject to physical coercion and oppression.
Id. However, they do not explain why in the United States during the nineteenth century,
when the coercion of labor was increasingly left to economic forces, sailors remained
subject to capture and penal sanctions for leaving their jobs.
99. NELSON, supra note 93, at 50.
100. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
46 (1949) (noting that until the 1830s the slave states and the free states attempted to
accommodate each other's ideologies and interests).
101. See 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 405 (1862) (identifying the status of slaves and indentured servants as the only form
of debt of service or labor that was universally maintained between the colonial
jurisdictions).
102. See FINKELMAN, supra note 59, at 83 (noting that the records of the Constitutional
Convention show that the framers assumed that the state and local governments would
return fugitive slaves to other states). The literature on slavery is vast. Some useful recent
works include: DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001);
SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY AND SELF-MAKING IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE
LAW, 1619-1860 (1996); SLAVERY & THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). For an
interesting discussion of the experience of some free Africans in the early colonial period,
see T.H. BREEN & STEPHEN INNES, "MYNE OWNE GROUND": RACE AND FREEDOM ON
VIRGINIA'S EASTERN SHORE, 1640-1676 (1980).
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navy. 03  The vessel's master could discipline a seaman through
confinement or beating.'0 4 Any effort to break the contract on the part of
the seaman would subject him not only to forfeiture of wages, as might be
expected in a breach of contract, but also to imprisonment at the hand of
civil authorities so that his master could reclaim him.'0 5 This right to
physically coerce the person of the seaman was embodied in acts of
Britain's Parliament, the laws passed by several of the colonial legislatures,
and the customary law of the sea that was applied by both colonial courts
and the Royal Vice Admiralty Courts. 106 Furthermore, in the colonies, both
the local courts and the courts of vice admiralty used the local jails to force
seamen to stay with their ships. 07
B. Other Land Based Labor
When describing the law of England in the eighteenth century,
Blackstone divided servants into four categories: menial servants, who
lived within the master's household and were hired for a year; apprentices,
who were bound to their masters to learn a trade; laborers, who lived on
their own and were hired by the day or week; and stewards, factors, and
bailiffs, who managed other servants.'0 8 In addition, North America had a
large population of indentured servants who provided much of the labor for
the Southern plantations until the eighteenth century.'09 Employers had a
proprietary interest in their employees, and all forms of labor were subject
103. See Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law Origins of
the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361,
394-95 (1999) (comparing the liberal contract enforcement law for mariners with the severe
duty enforcement law, which was only surpassed in severity by the military).
104. MORRIS, supra note 94, at 262-63.
105. See Gutoff, supra note 103, at 395 (identifying imprisonment as a threatened
punishment to force seamen to do their duties and to bind them to their ships).
106. See, e.g., REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW
YORK AND IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1715-1788, at 5 (Hon.
Charles Merrill Hough ed., 1925) (noting a 1717 case to enforce a claim for wages in the
Vice Admiralty Court of New York).
107. See REDIKER, supra note 45, at 141.
108. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *425-28.
109. See MORRIS, supra note 94, at 315-90 (describing the sources and extent of bound
labor in the colonies and specifically noting the demand for redemptioners on tobacco
plantations). For descriptions of how a society based on bound labor was transformed into
one based on slavery, see RICHARD S. DUNN, SUGAR AND SLAVES: THE RISE OF THE PLANTER
CLASS IN THE ENGLISH WEST INDIES, 1624-1713 (1972), and RICHARD B. SHERIDAN, SUGAR
AND SLAVERY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WEST INDIES, 1623-1775 (1973).
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to physical coercion."0  Courts regularly required specific performance,
and there were statutes providing for the return of indentured servants."'
IV. SLAVERY AND MARITIME LABOR RELATIONS: THE NEED FOR
PHYSICAL CONTROL
The need for physical control of slaves requires no explanation. If
slaves could escape, they would. While seamen were not subject to the
same physical constraints as slaves, there were very real incentives to leave
one vessel for another because maritime labor was a scarce and valuable
commodity.
At the time of the founding, "the only significant form of commerce
[for North America] was maritime commerce.""' 2 Prior to the introduction
of the railroad, inland travel was far too cumbersome to move goods, and,
prior to the introduction of the steam-powered vessel, travel upriver was
not a practical means of importing goods into the various states."3 While
the economy of the United States would eventually turn inward," 4 at the
end of the eighteenth century maritime trade was the life-blood of the
country." 5 Of course, this maritime commerce depended on a steady
supply of skilled maritime labor. John Adams noted that the English
recognized the importance of trained seamen." 6  This importance is
reflected in Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law, which
introduces thirty-one heavily footnoted pages on the rights and duties of
seamen by noting that seamen were "usually a heedless, ignorant,
audacious, but most useful class of men.""' 7
Today, the supply of maritime labor is not as much of a problem;
indeed, in this country, skilled merchant sailors go looking for jobs." 8
Nonetheless, in the eighteenth century maritime labor was at a premium
because the skill required to man a merchant vessel was difficult to acquire
110. See NELSON, supra note 93, at 50-51 (specifically discussing imposition of corporal
punishment on all kinds of bound laborers).
111. Id.
112. Gutoffsupra note 103, at 391.
113. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 11-12 (C. Vann Woodward
ed., 1988) (describing the state of transportation in the United States before the coming of
steam power).
114. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 137-39
(Vintage Books ed. 1993) (1991) (detailing the expansion of domestic trade in the U.S.).
115. RICHARD BUEL, JR., IN IRONS: BRITAIN'S NAVAL SUPREMACY AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY ECONOMY (Yale University Press 1998).
116. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 4, 1785), in 1 THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, 1735-1826, at 48-49 (Lester J. Capon ed., 1959).
117. 3 KENT, supra note 16, at * 176 (emphasis added).
118. See generally JOHN MCPHEE, LOOKING FOR A SHIP (1990) (describing the problems
associated with making a living as a merchant mariner).
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and the trade was highly dangerous." 9 The various functions that are now
mechanized and, in many cases, computerized on a merchant vessel or
naval ship required the joint and trained efforts of the ship's crew. 20 Thus,
the control of vessel's propulsion, navigation, and, on a man-of-war,
weapons, which are today mechanized and, often, computerized, was
accomplished manually by individuals who needed years to become fully
adept at their various skills.'2 ' In addition to requiring many skills,
maritime labor was uncomfortable, 2 2 dangerous, 123 and subject to the
severe discipline of the ship's master.'
14
119. See Gutoff, supra note 103, at 392-93 (detailing the skills and difficult conditions of
sailors).
120. See DANA, supra note 2, at 5 (describing a new sailor's bewilderment at the
preparations involved in preparing to set sail).
121. Id. See also GREG DENING, MR. BLIGH'S BAD LANGUAGE: PASSION, POWER AND
THEATRE ON THE BOUNTY 57 (1992) (describing the seamen's precise language and
coordinated control over their dangerous environment); Gutoff, supra note 103, at 392 n. 129
(detailing the need for highly skilled actions). For some idea of the complexity of sailing a
square-rigged vessel, see Samuel Eliot Morison's description of tacking; that is, turning a
vessel through the wind, in SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, JOHN PAUL JONES: A SAILOR'S
BIOGRAPHY 73-75 (1959). Today, a novice sailor would learn how to tack on his or her first
day on a small pleasure craft. Morison's description, along with an explanation of a set of
eighteenth century notes for staffing the maneuver, runs for nearly two pages, and it does
not include an explanation of technical terms or what the individual sailors would have to
do.
122. The sailors of a vessel had their quarters in steerage, the part of the vessel in front of
the main mast, from which Dana's famous book describing his service as a sailor takes its
title. See DANA, supra note 2, at 5 (describing his living quarters on the Pilgrim). This was
the part of the vessel most exposed to the action of wind and water. Despite the sailors'
constant efforts to caulk the space between the vessel's planks with tar and strands of hemp
fiber picked from rope, it was almost always leaky and, in the North Atlantic, cold. In
addition, for many of the men, who were mostly in their teens and twenties, the confinement
in a single-sex environment for months at a time could hardly have been desirable. But see
BARRY R. BURG, SODOMY AND THE PIRATE TRADITION: ENGLISH SEA ROVERS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CARIBBEAN, at xxxviii (2d ed. 1995) (stating that "one of the most
unusual homosexually oriented groups in history" was that of seventeenth-century
Caribbean pirates). For a discussion of the scholarly trend to view pirates as countercultural
heroes, see Laurence Osborne, A Pirate's Progress: How the Maritime Rogue Became a
Multicultural Hero, LINGUA FRANCA, Mar. 1998, at 40.
123. See, e.g., DANA, supra note 2, at 369 (giving a graphic description of the effects of
scurvy on various seamen); DENING, supra note 121, at 162-63 (noting the nutritional
problems faced by crews). Especially hazardous to the health of crews was the slave, or
Guinea, trade to the west coast of Africa. As one contemporary ditty admonished: "Beware
and take care/ Of the Bight of Benin/ For one that comes out/ There are forty go in."
REDIKER, supra note 45, at 47. While the mortality rate may not have been quite that high,
one historian estimates that, by the time a slave ship had finished trading along the African
coast and was preparing to depart for the westward "middle passage" across the Atlantic to
the Caribbean or North America, it could have lost somewhere between two-thirds and
three-quarters of its crew. TATTERSFIELD, supra note 19, at 25-26; see also REDIKER, supra
note 45, at 47-48 n.82 (noting extraordinary death rates among seamen).
124. See, e.g., DENING, supra note 121, at 113-14 (tabulating the percentage of crew
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Because of the highly-skilled nature of the work and its harsh
conditions, maritime labor was relatively scarce. 2 5 As Samuel Johnson
observed to James Boswell when the two took a short trip by boat off the
Scottish coast, "No man who can contrive to get himself into jail would go
to sea. For going to sea is like going to jail, except that at sea you can
drown. 1 2 6 One scholar has disputed this view of life at sea, or least life in
the eighteenth century Royal Navy.'27 However, it is clear that finding
sailors, especially in time of war when sailors were required by both navies
and merchant fleets, was a problem. 28  A reasonable conclusion is that
other labor markets must have been more attractive. 1
29
The shortage in skilled maritime labor gave sailors the great
opportunity to jump ship in search of higher wages and better conditions.
Thus, at least according to some participants in the industry, sailors in the
transatlantic trade were expected to jump ship in New York if the wages for
seamen were higher there than they had been when the sailor signed his
contract. 3 ° Similarly, ship jumping was viewed as a common problem in
Sdo Tom6, where ships in the slave trade stopped to prepare for their
westward passage.'3
Because ships were highly mobile, a sailor successfully jumping from
one ship to another was unlikely to be caught by his old master, and his
new master would be more than happy to have him take on the nearly
endless labor of working a ship. The records of the advertisements in
newspapers in colonial and early federalist Rhode Island'3 2 indicate that the
members who were flogged on the British voyages of discovery in the Pacific); REDIKER,
supra note 46, at 205-53 (describing how authority and violence were used to discipline
seamen).
125. See Gutoff, supra note 103, at 392-93 (discussing the scarcity of maritime labor).
126. James Boswell, Journal of a Tour to the Outer Hebredies with Samuel Johnson,
LLD, in JAMES BOSWELL & SAMUEL JOHNSON, BOSWELL'S JOURNAL OF A TOUR TO THE
OUTER HEBREDIES WITH SAMUEL JOHNSON, LLD AND JOHNSON'S JOURNEY TO THE WESTERN
ISLANDS OF SCOTLAND 247 (R. Chapman ed. 1924)
127. See generally N.A.M. RODGER, THE WOODEN WORLD: AN ANATOMY OF THE
GEORGIAN NAVY (1986) (detailing the social history of the British Navy in the eighteenth-
century). For a view of the Navy during the later Georgian period contrary to Rodger's, see
JONATHAN NEALE, THE CUTLASS AND THE LASH: MUTINY AND DISCIPLINE IN NELSON'S NAVY
(Pluto Press 1985).
128. See REDIKER & LINEBAUGH, supra note 13, at 161 (discussing the increased demand
for sailors in time of war).
129. See Gutoff, supra note 103, at 395 (describing laws enacted to encourage people to
enter the maritime industries).
130. See Lamb v. Two Trunks of Merchandize (N.Y. Ct. Adm. 1785), in REPORTS OF
CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK AND IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1715-1788, at 254 (Hon. Charles Merrill Hough
ed., 1925)).
131. See TATTERSFIELD, supra note 19, at 117-18 (describing one man's ship jumping
experience in SAo Tom6).
132. These advertisements have been compiled in MAUREEN ALICE TAYLOR, I
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maritime trades provides an unusual level of geographic mobility both for
those engaged as seamen and for those wishing to leave other forms of
bound labor, whether as indentured servants, slaves or members of the
military. Throughout the eighteenth century masters and owners of vessels
were placing advertisements for the return of sailors who jumped ship,' 33
and numerous advertisements seeking the return of apprentices, slaves and
other servants warned, undoubtedly in vain, masters of vessels not to take
on the fugitives.'34 The ready mobility of sailors may be seen in one notice,
in which the lieutenant of one vessel, the Providence, identified a ship-
jumping sailor by noting that the sailor claimed that he had previously
jumped ship from "the Phoenix Man of War."'1
35
In colonial times, the problem of slaves running to freedom was
minimal. 36  Similarly, while all of North America was under British
control, it was possible to maintain a uniform regime for the control of, if
not actual control over, maritime labor. 37  This changed with the
development of distinct sovereigns in the former British colonies and the
growing move toward abolition of slavery in the northern colonies. 1
38
By the time the First Congress concluded, the slave economy of the
south was under threat from a growing abolitionist movement in the north,
especially in Pennsylvania. 39 At the same time, the maritime economy of
the United States was feeling pressure on several fronts. The new United
RUNAWAYS, DESERTERS, AND NOTORIOUS VILLAINS FROM RHODE ISLAND NEWSPAPERS: THE
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, 1762-1800 (1994) [hereinafter 1 RUNAWAYS] and MAUREEN ALICE
TAYLOR & JOHN WOOD SWEET, 2 RUNAWAYS, DESERTERS, AND NOTORIOUS VILLAINS FROM
RHODE ISLAND NEWSPAPERS: ADDITIONAL NOTICES FROM THE PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, 1762-
1800 AS WELL AS ADVERTISEMENTS FROM ALL OTHER RHODE ISLAND NEWSPAPERS FROM
1732-1800 (2001) [hereinafter 2 RUNAWAYS].
133. See TAYLOR, 1 RUNAWAYS, supra note 132, at 1, 12, 131; TAYLOR & SWEET, 2
RUNAWAYS supra note 132, at 19, 21, 37, 57, 61, 81, 115; see also Id. at 106 (seeking six
merchant sailors who had sailed away with their master's vessel).
134. See generally TAYLOR, 1 RUNAWAYS supra note 132; TAYLOR & SWEET, 2
RUNAWAYS supra note 132, at ; see also TAYLOR, 1 RUNAWAYS 129 (seeking the return of
"three NEGROES" and speculating "as they all went away in a Canoe, that they probably
may be taken up at Sea by some Vessel or other.")
135. See TAYLOR, 1 RUNAWAYS supra note 132, at at 43.
136. To be sure, those fleeing slavery, if they felt comfortable doing so, could try to go
to sea, but for those removed from the major seaports with no experience or knowledge of
seagoing traffic, this may not have been an option. See FINKELMAN, supra note 100, at 46
(explaining the predicament of slaves who had no means of political participation or
enforcement of favorable laws).
137. See REDIKER, supra note 45, at 119-21 (describing the proliferation of the vice-
admiralty courts).
138. See FINKELMAN, supra note 100, at 41-46 (explaining the growing prohibition of
slavery in the northern colonies, through banning the importation of slaves from Africa and
restricting the importation of slaves from other states).
139. See id. at 46-55 (detailing how Pennsylvania dealt with slavery).
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States was cut off from supplying the British sugar plantations. 140 It was
this trade that provided the livelihood of the great cod fisheries off New
England, which were, in the words of John Adams, a nursery of
"6seamen.' 141 Moreover, the fact that hostilities between France and
England were imminent would have directly driven up the price of
maritime labor both by making maritime labor more dangerous and by
reducing the number of maritime workers available for the merchant
service. 42 In addition, there was the problem that seamen signing onto
vessels in one state might try to jump ship in another. 143 Of course, one
explanation may be that American merchants simply wanted the same
protections they had had under imperial British law.
In colonial times, the problem of fleeing slaves had not been much of
a problem. To be sure, in Somerset v. Stewart, the Court of King's Bench
had held that a slave brought into England from the colonies could not be
held as a slave in England. 44 According to the court, the right of slave
owners to hold slaves had no basis in natural law, and therefore this right
could be enforced only as a matter of positive law. 145 Because there was no
positive English law recognizing slavery, there was no basis for holding a
slave in England. 46 However, the northern colonies respected the southern
colonies' laws and interests. Because of comity principles and the
recognition of slavery in both the northern and southern colonies, masters
from one state had no problem seeking the return of slaves from other
states. 147 After independence, however, the northern states began to move
toward the abolition of slavery.'41 The Fugitive Slave Clause in Article IV
of the Constitution was a direct response to this concern. 
1
49
140. See generally BUEL, supra note 115 (discussing the British Navy and the American
revolutionary economy).
141. KURLANSKY, supra note 57, at 100.
142. See REDIKER & LINEBAUGH, supra note 13, at 146-48 (describing plans to acquire
and retain maritime labor during times of war).
143. This problem was also noted during the framers' debates on the Constitution. See 4
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 19
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1941) (noting the problem of the "contemptible state of Rhode
Island" refusing to turn over a seaman who had stolen a vessel from its Dutch owner).
144. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
145. Id.
146. Id. For discussions of Somerset, see William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974);
Jerome Nadelhaft, The Somersett Case and Slavery: Myth, Reality, and Repercussions, 51 J.
NEGRO HIST. 193 (1966).
147. See FINKELMAN, supra note 100, at 21 (describing how slavery was affected by the
full faith and credit and the privileges and immunities clauses).
148. See id. at 41-46 (discussing the individual approaches towards abolition taken by
the northern states).
149. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("No
Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another
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V. THE SLAVE POWER AND THE MARITIME POWER
While the regulation of servile and maritime labor may have been
necessary and unexceptional in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth
century saw a dramatic change in relations between master and servant. As
the nineteenth century progressed, bound forms of labor such as indenture
and apprenticeship declined, and more and more workers became free
laborers." 0 All forms of labor, with the exceptions of seamen and slaves,
increasingly became a purely contractual, monetary relationship between
employer and employee. 5' Employers lost the right to compel the
performance of their employees.'52  Up until the Emancipation
Proclamation, however, the power of slave owners to compel the work of
slaves increased. With the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, it
became easier for slave catchers to return slaves to, or capture free persons
of African descent for, slaveholders' 53 Similarly, the power of merchant
captains over the seamen on their vessels remained nearly absolute.
54
Throughout the period, courts approved of brutal and humiliating
treatment of seamen, and the Merchant Seamen's Act of 1790 and its
successor, the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, continued to allow
masters to have fleeing seamen summarily seized, imprisoned, and returned
to their vessels. 5 5 Indeed, even after the Civil War, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment had ended slavery, federal
law continued to provide for the summary return and imprisonment of
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labor may
be due").
150. See generally STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 147-72 (discussing the
early American development of free labor). Recently Steinfeld has argued that because of
economic coercion labor remained unfree throughout the nineteenth century in spite of
rhetoric to the contrary. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 39-84 (2001) [hereinafter COERCION & CONTRACT]. The
question remains, however, why seamen were not included in the rhetorical change; that is,
assuming that labor was largely unfree in the nineteenth century, why were maritime
laborers unfree in a different way than their land-based counterparts?
151. STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 147-72.
152. Id. at 172.
153. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463-64 (1850).
154. See infra Part V.A.2 (comparing treatment of slaves and sailors during the
nineteenth century).
155. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790); Shipping Commissioners
Act, ch. 322, § 51, 17 Stat. 262, 273-74 (1872).
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runaway seamen, 56 "somewhat'as runaway slaves were in the days of
slavery."' 57
A. The Rise of Free Labor and the Anomalous Position of Slavery and
Maritime Labor
During the nineteenth century, the relationship between labor and
management became increasingly monetary; the simple exchange was
work for money. Neither worker nor employer had any further obligation,
and when the worker ceased to give labor, the employer's only recourse
was to stop giving money.'58  Neither employers using corporal
punishment, nor courts using the jails, could or would specifically enforce
labor contracts.'59
The exceptions to this trend in labor were slaves and seamen. As is
well known, up until the end of the Civil War, the federal government
made it increasingly easy for slave owners and putative slave owners to
claim fugitive slaves and, indeed, any person of African descent claimed to
be a slave. 60 As may be less well known, the lot of sailors remained much
the same as it had been when Congress passed the Merchant Seamen's
Act. 16 1 While the flogging of merchant sailors was prohibited in 1850,162
sailors continued to be subject to the physical correction of their masters
and to summary seizure, jailing, and return to their vessels should they
attempt to flee. 163 Even after involuntary servitude, and with it chattel
slavery, had been eliminated by the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress
156. Id. (providing for terms of imprisonment of up to three months for desertion and
one month for being absent without leave, and providing for the summary return of
deserting sailors and the forfeiture of their wages).
157. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. See STEINFELD,.FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 147-73.
159. Id. at 147-53.
160. See FEHRENBACHER,supra note 103, at 231-51 (discussing the treatment of fugitive
slaves from 1850 to 1864).
161. See generally Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131 (1790) (providing minimum
working standards for seamen and setting penalties for dereliction of duties and desertion).
162. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 513, 515 (1850) (appropriating money for
the Navy to provide mail service with the proviso that "flogging in the navy and on board
vessels of commerce, be, and the same is hereby, abolished from and after the passage of
this act"). The elimination of flogging in the merchant service appears to have been placed
into the proviso to eliminate flogging in the Navy by Senator Yulee, an opponent of the bill,
in an effort to get northern senators to vote against it. The amendment passed without any
debate. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 2060 (1850); JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1850). It did not, however, prevent the proviso from being adopted,
nor, unsurprisingly, did it stop the naval appropriations bill that it was a part of from
becoming law. For an interesting discussion of the regional politics and psychology behind
the debates in Congress, see GLENN, supra note 9, at 113-17.
163. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790).
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increased the penalties on ship-jumping sailors, and the Supreme Court
held that the abolition of involuntary servitude had done nothing to change
the conditions under which seamen labored. 164
1. The Growth of Employment at Will
As Robert Steinfeld has explained, the understanding that employers
had a proprietary interest in their employees started to fade during the
nineteenth century.'65 Courts questioned, and eventually denied, the rights
of employers to specifically enforce their contracts of employment and to
physically correct their employees. 166 According to Steinfeld, by the end of
the eighteenth century English authorities held that hired adult laborers
were not subject to physical correction by their employers nor to
punishment by the law if they left their employment. 67 Only poor debtors
and minors bound to service or apprenticeship were subject to physical
coercion. 68 By the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, courts had
completely rejected the physical power of employers over their employees
and had refused to specifically enforce employment relations. 1
69
2. Slaves and Sailors: A Class Apart
Even as the nineteenth century moved away from the concept that an
employer had the right to physically control his employees, the power of
slave owners to restrain their labor force grew. Similarly, the nineteenth
century saw little diminution in the power of ships' captains over the
seamen under their command.
With the rise of abolitionism, many northern states passed laws
making the rendition of fugitive slaves more difficult by according the
purported slaves at least a modicum of due process.170 These efforts were,
however, rendered somewhat ineffectual by the Supreme Court's decision
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court considered the appeal of a
slave catcher who had been convicted of kidnapping in Pennsylvania for
seizing a runaway slave.' 7' He claimed that his conviction was contrary to
the Fugitive Slave Act. 172 The Court held that Congress had the implicit
164. Robertson, 165 U.S.at 287-88 (1897).
165. STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 147-72.
166. Id. at 149-53.
167. Id. at 148.
168. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 218-21 (1796).
169. See STEINFELD, FREE LABOR, supra note 14, at 149-53.
170. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 102, at 205-30 (discussing the fugitive slave legal
dilemma through 1850).
171. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 543 (1842).
172. Id. at 558.
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power to legislate to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause of the
Constitution.173 While the Court did hold that state courts were not bound
to enforce the Act, 74 in 1850 Congress passed another fugitive slave act,
making it even easier for masters to recover their slaves from northern
states. 175
Similarly, during the first decades of the nineteenth century, the power
of masters over seamen continued unabated. The Merchant Seamen's Act
continued to provide for the return of runaway sailors in a manner similar
to that in which slaves were recovered under the Fugitive Slave Act. 176 A
sailing master's authority to physically correct a sailor remained. In the
same work in which he had expressed doubt that the physical power of an
employer over an employee was "consistent with the spirit of contract,"'
17
Chancellor Kent explained that the master of a vessel "may imprison, and
also inflict reasonable corporal punishment upon a seaman, for
disobedience to reasonable commands, or for disorderly, riotous, or
insolent conduct; and his authority, in that respect, is analogous to that of a
master on land over his apprentice or scholar."' 78 While Dana believed that
eventually public sentiment, as expressed by juries awarding damages to
wrongfully or excessively punished sailors against their ships' masters,
would eventually bring about an end to the punishments inflicted on
seamen, 79 he was wrong.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the reported decisions of
American courts continued to approve of practices that may strike the
modern reader as too horrendous to read about, much less experience
firsthand. 8° In 1839, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered the beating of a ship's cook and concluded that a
"blow with a dirty frying pan" or "wiping a dirty knife" on the face of the
person whose duty it was to keep those articles clean was not an aggravated
or cruel assault.'8 ' For those who might be inclined to conclude just the
173. Id. at 616.
174. Id. at 622-23.
175. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463-64 (1850).
176. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 7, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790).
177. 3 KENT, supra note 16, at *261.
178. Id. at'*181-82.
179. See DANA, supra note 2, at 470-71 (predicting that "the infliction of [corporal
punishment] upon intelligent and respectable men, will be an enormity which will not be
tolerated by public opinion, and by juries, who are the pulse of the body politic").
180. There are, of course, problems in using reported decisions as a basis for empirical
findings. The point, however, is not that seamen lost personal injury actions at any greater
or lesser rate as the nineteenth century progressed, but rather that, throughout the middle and
latter part of the nineteenth century, when employers on land had no right to physically
correct their employees, members of the bench were willing to tolerate fairly harsh physical
abuse of seamen.
181. Forbes v. Parsons, 9 F. Cas. 417, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1839).
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opposite, the court explained that "[n]obody will believe that the law which
governs the deportment of men on shore to each other, can be applied to
their habits and conduct on board of a ship."' 82 Over twenty years later, the
Federal District Court for the District of California ruled that it was neither
cruel nor excessive punishment to keep two waiters ironed together for ten
hours for fighting in the cabin of a vessel.' 8 3 In 1876, the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas considered an action brought by a sailor who
claimed, and apparently proved, that he had been punished by his hands
being tied behind his back and being hung from under his arms so that his
"toes just touch[ed] the deck."'' 84 The plaintiff was awarded $300 in
damages, but, on a motion for a new trial, the court concluded that the
punishment would not have been unreasonable if the plaintiffs hands had
been fastened before him.'85 The court then denied the motion for a new
trial, but only on the condition that the plaintiff accept a reduction of the
verdict to $50.86 Two years later, in an action for damages by a steamship
chambermaid against the master of a ship on which she had served, the
evidence revealed that the chambermaid had threatened the master with a
lump of coal, and the master had kicked the coal from her hand and hit her
in the face with sufficient force to break her nose.'87 The court held that the
captain had been reasonable in his use of force.' 88 Similarly, in 1891, the
Federal District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed an action
by a seaman against a master who had beaten him about the head with a
broomstick for being suspected of theft. 8 9
In 1895, The Red Record, a publication of the sailors' union, told its
readers that over the prior seven years fourteen men had been killed by
shipboard discipline; it also gave numerous examples of sadistic treatment
for which masters had received little or no punishment.' 90 In one case
where seamen had complained that their vessel was undermanned, they had
182. Id. at 419.
183. Lindrop v. Dall, 15 F. Cas. 556, 556 (D. Cal. 1868).
184. Flynn v. Coming, 2 W.N.C. 223 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1876).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Johns v. Brinker, 30 La. Ann. 241, 241-42 (1878).
188. Id. at 243-44.
189. Healy v. Cox, 45 F. 119, 119 (D.S.C. 1891).
190. BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT: SEAMEN, LONGSHOREMEN AND
UNIONISM IN THE 1930s 13 (1988) (quoting NATIONAL SEAMEN'S UNION OF AMERICA, THE
RED RECORD: A BRIEF RESUME OF SOME OF THE CRUELTIES PERPETRATED UPON AMERICAN
SEAMEN AT THE PRESENT TIME (Coast Seamen's Journal) (1895)). Again, this is not
intended as evidence of how seamen were typically treated, but as evidence of what the
authorities would tolerate. Cf, HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREW FURUSETH: EMANCIPATOR OF
THE SEAMEN 3 (Univ. of Cal. Press) (1959) (stating that abusive treatment of sailors was an
exception to the usual treatment).
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been beaten, put in irons, and locked in the forecastle for two weeks.' 9 '
The shipping commissioner had ruled that this was "justifiable
discipline.' ' 192 In another case that resulted in an acquittal, a mate had
bitten a seaman so that "'a piece was bitten out of his left palm, a mouthful
of flesh was bitten out of his left arm, and his left nostril [was] torn away as
far as the bridge of his nose."" 93
The legislative sphere did not treat seamen any better than the judicial
branch. In 1872, Congress added to the provisions against ship-jumping
sailors by adding the penalty of imprisonment after a seaman's service had
been completed to the right to summarily detain and force seamen to serve,
which had been granted by the Merchant Seamen's Act of 1790.194 In
Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court upheld this act in the face of a
challenge based on the Thirteenth Amendment. 9' Despite the dissent of
Justice Harlan, who noted that sailors "were seized, somewhat as runaway
slaves were in the days of slavery,"' 196 the Court, after reviewing an
extensive array of historical material, concluded:
In the face of this legislation upon the subject of desertion and
absence without leave, which was in force in this country for
more than sixty years before the Thirteenth Amendment was
adopted, and similar legislation abroad from time immemorial, it
cannot be open to doubt that the provision against involuntary
servitude was never intended to apply to their contracts. 197
Seamen on American vessels were the only class of workers who would
not be completely free of the threat of imprisonment for simply quitting
their jobs until the second decade of the twentieth century. 98
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN SLAVE AND MARITIME LABOR
What was the reason for this power over maritime labor, power that
was, by the middle of the nineteenth century, similar only to the power of a
191. Nelson, supra note 190, at 13.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Shipping Commissioners Act, ch. 322, § 51, 17 Stat. 262, 273-74 (1872)
(repealed).
195. 165 U.S. 275, 287-88 (1897) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
of involuntary servitude does not apply to seamen's contracts).
196. Id. at 288 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 287-88.
198. Steinfeld argues that the decision in Baldwin reflected a broader division within the
United States on the meaning of free labor. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the decision
was only meant to apply to seamen, and he does not point to any other large class of
workers who were subject to physical coercion. STEINFELD, COERCION & CONTRACT, supra
note 151, at 270-75.
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slaveholder over his slaves and, after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, unique? At this point, it is not possible to say. Several
reasons are apparent and may provide partial answers. One reason may
have been racial and ethnic. As Jeffrey Bolster has shown, the maritime
trades were more open than most to persons of color.' 99 Similarly, as
Marcus Rediker has explained, the labor market for the transatlantic trade
was truly international, 00 and some may have doubted that the Anglo-
Saxon concept of the purely contractual nature of labor could have been
understood by other nations and cultures. Thus, even the sensitive
abolitionist Richard Henry Dana, who decried the flogging he had
witnessed aboard the ship,2°1 was, in 1840, able to explain the need for
ships' masters to have physical power over their workers:
There may be pirates or mutineers among them; and one bad man
will often infect all the rest; and it is almost certain that some of
them will be ignorant foreigners, hardly understanding a word of
our language, accustomed all their lives to no influence but force,
and perhaps nearly as familiar with the use of the knife as with
that of the marlin-spike.0 2
Six decades later, Andrew Furuseth, the maritime labor organizer, would
complain that the American merchant service was "manned by the
residuum of the population, not only of our country and race, but of all
countries and races. 20 3
Another reason may have been the continued perception of sailors as
irresponsible beings who could not regulate their own labor relations. As
Chancellor Kent explained, "[s]ubordination is essential to be strictly
enforced, among a class of men whose manners and habits partake of the
attributes of the element on which they are employed.,
20 4
Still another reason may have been that the solutions for land-based
and sea-based labor both favored the employers because they held the
political power. Whether sanctioned by law or not, land-based workers not
marked by distinctive physical features (as were slaves of African descent)
199. See W. JEFFREY BOLSTER, BLACK JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMEN IN THE AGE
OF SAIL 2 (Harvard Univ. Press 1997) (stating that about one-fifth of American sailors were
African-American men during the nineteenth century).
200. See REDIKER, supra note 46, at 79 (citing examples of two men who traveled
internationally as privateers).
201. DANA supra note 2, at 122-23; see also DANA, supra note 2, at 415 (stating "no one
can have a greater abhorrence of the infliction of such punishment than I have, and a
stronger conviction that severity is bad policy with a crew").
202. Id.
203. JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG, THE MARITIME STORY: A STUDY IN LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1957) (quoting the AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST 94
(1900)).
204. 3 KENT, supra note 16, at * 182.
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could always leave and disappear into the expanding population and vast
landmass of North America. However, sailors had nowhere to go while
they were at sea, and foreign sailors without a clear command of English
had few options, even in port. If the law would allow it, a property interest
could be claimed in their labor. It is not certain that there was a nineteenth
century "maritime power" similar to the antebellum "slave power," which,
like the slave power, may have controlled the courts and legislatures, but it
is possible.
The two justices most associated with the slave power were Justice
Story, who upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and held any state laws
to the contrary to be unconstitutional, °5 and Chief Justice Taney, who
upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and issued the Dred Scott opinion,
which guaranteed the right of slaveholders to travel with their slaves,
invalidated the Missouri Compromise, and denied persons of color
citizenship in the United States.0 6
Story and Taney were also two of the three great proponents of the
federal admiralty jurisdiction. At the start of the nineteenth century, Story
advocated the expansion of the admiralty jurisdiction to include all torts
within the "ebb and flow of the tide," and all contracts of a maritime
nature, although the jurisdiction of the English High Court of Admiralty
had been limited to waters outside the body of a country and to contracts
made aboard a ship.20 7 Story also drafted legislation that expanded the
body of admiralty law into the Great Lakes.0 8 During his tenure as Chief
Justice, Taney authored several opinions that expanded the admiralty
jurisdiction inland to include all waters navigable in interstate and
international commerce, which rendered Justice Story's legislative program
superfluous.0 9 Moreover, at about the same time that the Court in Prigg
was setting out the implied legislative power of Congress under the
205. See Prigg, v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 614 (1842) (holding that state laws that
were contrary to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 offended the Extradition Clause found in
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2).
206. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1 (holding that slaves were not entitled to the rights of citizens, and Congress could
not change that fact).
207. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 419 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). The Supreme Court
eventually accepted Story's views. See Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 13 (1870) (arguing
in favor of a large jurisdiction over maritime contracts).
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1948) (granting right to jury trials for parties to cases arising
among vessels navigating lakes).
209. See, e.g., Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851) (stating that
"certainly there can be no reason for admiralty power over a public tide-water, which does
not apply with equal force to any other public water used for commercial purposes and
foreign trade").
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Fugitive Slave Clause, it was starting to articulate a similar implied
legislative power under the grant of admiralty jurisdiction.
210
The standard explanation for the relationship between the Supreme
Court's slavery and admiralty jurisprudence is the one offered by Preeble
Stoltz. 21I For Stoltz, the most reasonable explanation is that the pro-slavery
justices wished to expand congressional power under the admiralty
jurisdiction as an alternative to expanding congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.212  According to Stoltz, the fear was that, under an
expanded understanding of its Commerce Clause power, Congress could
have prohibited slavery altogether.2 3 While possible, this seems unlikely.
The southern states had a firm grip on the Senate, and, indeed, had
managed to pass the harsh (or favorable to slave owners) Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850.214 If abolitionist forces had been able to control Congress,
they could have done slavery significant damage simply by prohibiting the
interstate slave trade, which formed an important, if not vital, part of the
southern economy.15
A better explanation may be that the Court's findings that the Fugitive
Slave Clause and the grant of admiralty jurisdiction implied that Congress
had the power to legislate on those topics were a result of the republic's
need to maintain itself as a stable economic unit. This economic stability
would not have been possible if slaves had been able to flee to the north
without much fear of capture, or if merchant sailors in service on the great
inland lakes and rivers, as well as on the high seas, had been able to leave
their employment at will. Whether this explanation is accurate cannot now
be determined. It is clear, however, that both the conditions of maritime
labor and slavery and the jurisprudence of admiralty and the federal power
over fugitive slaves have a very close relationship.
210. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622-23.
211. Preble Stoltz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REV. 661
(1963).
212. Id. at 676 (stating that the Court tried to disassociate the judicial power in admiralty
from the legislative power over commerce to broaden the legislature's jurisdiction over in-
land water ways).
213. Id. at 674 n.53 (stating that some southern slaveholding interests were concerned
that a shift in power in Congress would lead to direct congressional action against slavery).
214. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 7, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
215. Compare FREDERIC BANCROFT, SLAVE-TRADING IN THE OLD SOUTH 88-90 (1931)
(arguing that the slave trade was a necessary part of the southern economy for states along
the Atlantic seaboard where the plantation economy was no longer profitable), with
MICHAEL TADMAN, SPECULATORS AND SLAVES: MASTERS, TRADERS, AND SLAVES IN THE OLD
SOUTH 111-32 (1989) (arguing that an extensive slave trade existed within the old south, but
that the motive for the trade was extra profit rather than economic survival).
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VII. CONCLUSION
No form of labor was more abusive to workers than slave labor. None
other presented such perpetual coercion and loss of hope. None other
involved the same threat of losing family ties. Nonetheless, there were
other forms of coerced labor in the eighteenth century. Maritime labor in
particular was subject to provisions similar to those applied to slaves. Both
slavery and maritime labor endured as examples of forced labor, anomalies
of the nineteenth century. Forced maritime labor endured into the
twentieth century. The existence of slavery until the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment can perhaps be explained by the existence of a
slave power. Why forced maritime labor survived as long as it did requires
further exploration.
